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Summary: The purpose of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) is to 
enhance traffic safety and efficiency. ADAS can be considered as a (still 
incomplete) collection of systems and subsystems towards a fully automated 
highway system, such as autonomous cars. However, as many researchers argue, 
in assessing the benefits of ADAS it has to be taken into account that any gains in 
terms of security may be again reduced by the fact they affect the drivers' 
behavior. In this paper, we introduce a schema of possible negative effects of 
advanced driver assistant systems according to which consequences of a system 
failure largely depend on the magnitude of over-reliance. Based on that schema, 
we itemize hypotheses on possible behavioral effects of a specific ADAS type, 
namely local danger alerts.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) is to enhance traffic safety and 
efficiency. Their benefits are potentially very large because they may considerably contribute to 
decreasing human suffering, economical cost and pollution (Brookhuis et al., 2001). 
Consequently, economic principles as well as an unacceptable number of accidents have given 
rise to an increasingly fast development of electronic driving aids. ADAS can be considered as a 
(still incomplete) collection of systems and subsystems towards a fully automated highway 
system, such as autonomous cars. ADAS may operate in advisory, semi automatic or automatic 
mode, all of which may have different impact on driving and consequently also on traffic safety.  
 
However, as many researchers argue, in assessing the benefits of ADAS it has to be taken into 
account that any gains in terms of security may be again reduced by the fact they affect the 
drivers' behavior (Gründl, 2005). In this paper, we review the literature on behavioral aspects of 
ADAS, adopt a set of criteria introduced by Pfafferoth & Huguenin (1991), and introduce a 
schema of negative effects. We furthermore introduce local danger alerts (LDA) as a particular 
type of ADAS and apply the set of criteria to it. Finally, differences between the experimental 
situations for local danger alert assessment and real life are discussed. 
 
PROPOSED SCHEMA 
 
First of all, providing information (e.g. warning messages) potentially leads to a situation where 
the driver's attention is diverted from traffic. This issue has to be taken into account when 
designing in-car systems. In the context of local danger alerts, for example, (Cao et al., 2010) 
compare various modalities (vision, speech) in order to find out the optimal way to deliver the 
warning message. However, we do not consider this effect a behavioral aspect as it represents an 
immediate reaction to the system rather than a side effect of taking over (parts of) the driving 
PROCEEDINGS of the Sixth International Driving Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment, Training and Vehicle Design 
 117 
task. The latter might result in a reduction of the drivers' level of attention (Brookhuis et al., 
2001) or make her/him engage in some other unrelated task causing driver distraction – from 
selecting music to reading a novel in extreme cases (Gründl, 2005). Let us call this behavioral 
effect "attention decrease/shift" (AD/S) as this term is addressing not only behavioral effects like 
“driver distraction” as an attention shift, but also a decrease of the overall driver’s attention level. 
As a result, the driver might too late become aware of a sudden hazard or might be not ready for 
an adequate reaction. If we look at a sudden change between easy and difficult driving 
conditions—which is not necessarily a hazard—we can speak of a "transition problem" (TP). 
Here, the driver is not able to perform the sudden shift between cognitive underload (easy 
driving conditions with help of the system) to cognitive overload (difficult driving conditions 
eventually without help of the system). This effect also plays a role with fully autonomous cars 
since it is very likely that these systems will have to have a manual override mode in practice.  
 
Another negative effect of ADAS might be drivers taking risks, which they would not take 
without the system. The likelihood and magnitude of such "risk adaptations" (RA) are not 
random or arbitrary, but rather depend on certain conditions. Pfafferoth & Huguenin (1991) 
introduce five general criteria that influence the occurrence of RA in the context of security 
measures. According to the authors, the likelihood of RA increases: 
 
 the more the driver interacts with the system, 
 the more immediate the feedback is, 
 the more the system widens the driver's scope of action,  
 the more it increases subjective safety, and 
 the more it superimposes risky driving tendencies. 
 
Hence, in order to adapt to the new condition, the driver has to be aware of the system or at least 
needs to know that it exists. Assistance systems that the driver is not aware of until a (near) crash 
are unlikely to cause RA effects. Consequently, RA becomes more likely if the driver is able to 
gain concrete experience with the causes and effects of the system by interacting frequently and 
immediately with it. Obviously, autonomous cars give continuous feedback to the driver because 
s/he will certainly be aware of the car driving by itself. 
 
If the system even allows the choice of new exposure conditions (more extreme driving 
situations, higher speeds, etc.), the likelihood RA increases as well. Furthermore, RA is to be 
expected if subjective safety is increased by the system with the driver being convinced of 
her/his improved capability to handle critical situations. Finally, depending on personality, 
motivation, driving style, or current mood of the driver, the potential provided by the system 
could be (mis-)used in order to drive more experimentally or fun-oriented. The driver could "just 
for fun" try out maneuvers s/he wouldn't dare without the assistance of the system or use the 
system as a support for sensation seeking. 
 
Gründl (2005) applies the scheme to a number of driver assistance systems in order to rate their 
impact on safety. The author analyzed more than 300 accidents by interviewing the drivers and 
by technically reconstructing the accident details. The automatic emergency brake, he concludes, 
is only marginally prone to RA effects because it is virtually unperceivable by the driver aside 
from (near) crash situations (criteria 1) and it does not play any role in regular driving (criteria 2-
-5). On the contrary, with night vision and adaptive curve light, the RA likelihood is rated 
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particularly high. According to the author, the effects of the latter systems are permanently 
perceivable (criteria 1, 2). Furthermore, the enhanced vision leads to an increased scope of action 
(criteria 3) as drivers, who used to avoid driving at night, might now become less reluctant; 
others might also drive faster (also criteria 4,5). According to (Gründl, 2005) fully autonomous 
cars are considered critical by most experts, because the driver is absolved from responsibility 
and liabilities after a crash are unclear. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary of various possible negative effects ADAS may have on safety 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the various possible negative effects, which ADAS may have on safety. 
The nodes of the diagram are mainly based on Gründl (2005) as described above and the edges 
represent mutual influences between them. There is likely to be a trade-off between risk 
adaptation RA and attention decrease or shift (AD/S) in a sense that if the driver takes higher 
risks s/he will not be simultaneously less attentive and vice versa. This appears to be plausible, as 
taking a higher risk normally rises people’s the stress level and physical arousal. On the other 
hand somebody who is distracted from driving or who is getting tired will rather compensate the 
attention decrease/shift for example by decreased speed or larger distance to a lead vehicle. As a 
result the driver has more time for reactions to an event in the environment. However, over-
estimating the functionality or reliability of the system (OR) might increase the effects of both 
RA as well das AD/S. That means that the sheer trust in the system, even if its not fully justified, 
might make us drive riskier or become less attentive to the primary driving task.  
 
In extreme cases, the transition problem (TP) can be intensified by a combination of OR and 
AD/S: after a long drive on a relatively empty freeway supported by a lane keeping assistant or 
possibly even by a fully autonomous car, the driver's attention has sunk to a very low level. All 
of a sudden, s/he approaches an unclear and confusing location – and just in that moment manual 
override becomes necessary because the system fails. Thus, over reliance is an important factor 
in the overall equation that results in negative effects on safety.  
Our basic assumptions are supported by signal detection theory, which describes the relation 
between automation false alarms (FA)/ misses (MISS) and operator dependence (Meyer, 2001). 
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It has been demonstrated, that an increase in automation false alarms decreases the operator's 
compliance resulting in longer response time to alerts and in some cases operators would even 
disregard those alerts (Dixon et al., 2007). An increasing automation's miss rate, on the other 
hand side, leads to a reduction of reliance and to closer examination of raw data in order to better 
avoid missing anything. Conversely, if during a longer period of time only a marginal percentage 
of misses is occurring, the driver might excessively trust the warning system and be less 
conscientious when checking the raw data or even rely completely on the system.  
 
BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF LOCAL DANGER ALERTS 
 
Local danger alert (LDA) is an important function of ADAS to improve the safety of driving. 
Besides directly sensing the environment to detect danger (Gavrila, 2001), recent advances in 
inter-vehicle communication technology (e.g. wireless ad-hoc networks car-2-car 
communication) further allow the exchange of information between cars (Kosch, 2004). This 
enables a much wider application of local danger warnings, as drivers can be alerted to 
approaching danger that is not yet visible. We focus on a scenario where drivers are warned 
about road obstacles that are a short distance ahead but not yet visible (e.g. due to a bend of the 
road or a leading vehicle), therefore requiring an immediate reaction (Mahr et al. 2010, Cao et al. 
2010).  
 
Table 1. Analysis of local danger warnings according to the criteria illustrated in Figure 1 
 
 
 
Table 1 analyses this particular type of local danger warnings according to the criteria introduced 
by (Pfafferoth & Huguenin, 1991) with respect to the schema illustrated in Figure 1. Generally, 
there is a difference between the experimental situation and real life. First of all, obstacles appear 
much more frequent during the experiment that on the road and thus the interaction with the 
system happens more frequently. Note, however, that an LDA system is likely to take effect at 
least once or twice on a long journey. Therefore, the driver is able to gain experience with the 
system and s/he will certainly be aware that it exists (as opposed to the automatic emergency 
brake example described above). Nevertheless, due to the higher value with respect to this 
criterion, it is to be expected that (yet to be described) effects are stronger in the experiment than 
they are in real life. On the other hand side, with some of the criteria the relation is vice versa: 
The experimental situation allows no widening of action scope as it is limited by the task and 
there is most probably no superimposing of risky behavioral tendencies as the experiment 
generates very little fun. Also, the increase in subjective safety might have a less strong effect 
because the lives of the subjects are not endangered. Altogether, it can be argued that 
diminishing and amplifying factors counterbalance each other thereabout.  
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Table 1 also anticipates the relation between ADAS types investigated here and fully 
autonomous cars at the far end of the spectrum. Whether or not the driver interacts frequently 
with the system depends: of course, sparse interaction is the basic idea of autonomous systems. 
On the other hand side, it is likely that in large-scale field test, which will become necessary in 
order to prepare dissemination of the technology, parameter-setting or other kind of interaction 
will be rather frequent. As discussed earlier, the feedback will in any case be very direct. With 
more elaborate technology, it is even imaginable that widening of action scope respectively 
enhancement of risky driving take place, for example if the technology allow driving faster or 
cope with more difficult terrain that the (particular) human driver.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
ADAS technology is susceptible to behavioral impacts such as attention decrease/shift and over-
reliance. A system’s reliability and sensitivity can be viewed in terms of false alarm rate and 
miss rate. By varying the threshold settings for the decision criterion, designers are often able to 
trade one against the other (Parasuraman et al., 1997), as previous research has stated that false 
alarms could be more harmful to a user’s performance than miss rate (Bliss, 2003; Dixon et al., 
2006; Wickens & Dixon, 2007), while on the other hand a certain level of miss rate is tolerable, 
especially in demanding multi-tasking situations. Therefore the decision criterion for warnings 
should be set conservatively so drivers are aware of the possible (but relatively rare) misses and 
will therefore stay vigilant on the road. Of course the base rate of the critical situations (in which 
the system should become active) also needs to be considered for every single ADAS, as this 
particularly influences the false alarm and miss rate and therefore the perceived reliability. For 
the local danger warnings the base rate is probably higher than for systems like the emergency 
brake, but clearly lower than for other ADAS like the high beam assistant. As mentioned earlier 
a local danger alert is still likely to occur about one or two times during a long trip. 
 
It was suggested that system reliability levels of 70% to 75% represent an optimum threshold for 
imperfect reliability assistance (Wickens & Dixon, 2007). Accordingly, a 75% reliable system 
would be better for the use on the road than one with 99% reliability. No technical system will be 
100% failure-free – especially when taking into account driver „failures“ like deactivating the 
system accidentally or not perceiving or realizing the system output at all. For example if a 
driver does not see, hear or feel a warning this seems to be a system failure for her/him. Even a 
technically perfect system would most probably result in a critical miss rate that is only close to 
0%, leading to very rare misses which are particularly dangerous. Our research (Mahr et al., 
2010) veers towards this argumentation, as rare misses potentially lead to severe performance 
decline accompanied by rising stress levels. This arises questions on the rollout strategy for fully 
autonomous cars, either into large-scale field test or into practice. The technology is susceptible 
for behavioral impacts such as attention decrease/shift and transition problems in combination 
with over-reliance. At the same time, autonomous cars will unlikely be 100% failure free. To 
sum up, the behavioral effects have to be taken into account, when setting the decision criterion 
of any ADAS and engineers must ensure that drivers are always aware that the system may fail. 
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